When was seoul captured

It would take a couple hours, but you can't into the North by car, if at all. You may want to rephrase your question. Do you want the temp in N. Seoul is the capital and largest city of South Korea, and it is the 5th largest city in the world. It is not located in North Korea; it is located in South Korea. The capital of South Korea is Seoul.

It is known for political, commercial, industrial, and transportation. Seoul is the capital of the Republic of Korea, e. South Korea. No, it's the capital of South Korea. It's in the northern part of South Korea. Korea is divided into two countries - North and South Korea.

Log in. North Korea. Flight Times. See Answer. Best Answer. Study guides. Write your answer Related questions. Is there a Seoul North Korea? The regiment deployed the 3d and 1 st Bns in assault against Hills and A respectively. But after initial rapid progress along the approaches, both battalions were slowed up by a heavy concentration of small arms and automatic fire. The attack was continued on the morning of 22 September with the Korean battalion in line between the 1 st and 3d Bns of the RCT A Co led an assault on Hill A, only to be pinned down by automatic and small arms fire from the front and left.

C Co tackled the position from the right with no better success, and late that afternoon B Co was brought up for a concerted effort. Following an intensive air and artillery preparation, the 1 st Bn attacked the hill from two sides and swept up to the top at Meanwhile the 3d Bn had met lighter resistance on Hill , and H Co took the position with relatively few losses. These same two days were the occasion of a savage fight on the other side of the Han as the 1 st Marines seized Yongdungdo.

On the 19 th and 20 th the regiment had plugged slowly forward along the Inchon-Seoul highway against opposition which continued to increase. Observation from captured high ground made it evident that the enemy had concentrated in and about the industrial suburb for a strongly organized defense. Land mines slowed up the advance, depriving the Marines of tank support for hours at a stretch until engineers could clear the road.

Curious as it may seem, the enemy had made little use so far of a weapon so well suited to his delaying tactics. This deficiency adds to the evidence that shock and dislocation, resulting from the rapidity of Marine penetrations, had handicapped the defense more than lack of numbers and equipment. Marine veterans of Pacific island campaigns could recall occasions when fewer Japanese, defending prepared positions, had sold every inch of ground dearly.

But the North Korean forces were at last using tactics which might have profited them earlier, and the efforts of a reinforced company of Marine engineers were needed to clear the Inchon-Seoul highway of mines. On 19 September the 32d Infantry relieved the 1 st Marines of responsibility for the area south of the highway.

Next day the Leathernecks completed their advance to the west bank of Kalchon Creek, on the western outskirts of Yongdungpo. The main assault was launched at on 21 September by all three battalions jumping off abreast from this position.

The 1 st and 2d Bns, on the left and right, encountered such deadly mortar and artillery fire that late in the afternoon the 2d had to be withdrawn, thinned by casualties. The break in the attack came when A Co swung around from the northwest to enter the town from the southwest.

Maneuver and surprise turned the trick, and by nightfall these troops had advanced through the southern edge of Yongdungpo along a road leading to the airstrip east of town. There the Leathernecks dug in on both sides of the road to await the expected counterattack. It had been a long time since veterans of Pacific island campaigns had heard foemen screaming, "Banzai! As a preliminary, four T tanks moved up to a parallel secondary road, firing their 76mm guns and machine guns at point-blank ranges.

A Marine 3. Three North Korean infantry attacks followed in rapid succession, and each time the enemy was slaughtered. At daybreak some corpses and about 50 automatic weapons were counted, though the A Co casualties had been light. At daybreak a welcome anticlimax awaited the 1 st Marines. The remaining elements of the regiment attacked at , only to find the suburb evacuated by battered defenders who had retreated across the Han under cover of darkness.

With the capture of Yongdungpo, it was possible for the division to put into operation its plan for a two-regiment drive through Seoul. Although the original concept was modified by X Corps in an order directing the 32d Infantry to cross the Han and enter Seoul from the southeast, the main burden of capturing the city still fell upon the 1 st and 5 th Marines.

The modified plan of 23 September called for the 5 th Marines to continue their assault on the enemy positions on the western edge of the city while the 1 st Marines crossed the Han on the right flank of the 5 th , moved southeast along the river bank, then pivoted to the northeast and attacked through the heart of the city.

Meanwhile two battalions of the 7 th Marines were to advance across the northern edge of the city to prevent the enemy from escaping to the north. These moves were executed on schedule. The 7 th Marines less the 3d Bn moved into their assigned zone on the 23d. The 2d Bn swung quickly over to the right flank of the 5 th Marines, and the 1 st Bn passed through to seize Hill 79 at Not only had the enemy been heavily reinforced in this area, but his tactics were formidable. Expert use was made of cover in reverse slope positions, and smoke pots did much to conceal Marine air and artillery targets.

Supplementing the usual NK automatic and mortar fire, accurate artillery fire was laid down with a high proportion of white phosophorus. Marine close air and artillery support continued to be excellent.

Nevertheless, it remained for the infantry of the 5 th Marines to close with an enemy making a last-ditch stand on ground of his choosing.

Some intricate maneuvers were executed in preparation for the assault of 24 September. The three battalions tied in for the night with orders to continue the assault in the morning. The 3d Bn of the latter had been returned to its control after being relieved on the Kumpo Peninsula by elements of the th RCT. This Army regiment was ordered by corps to clear the peninsula while relieving the 7 th Marines of responsibility for covering the corps and division left flank, the Han crossing, and Kimpo Airfield.

The 32d Inf was to advance on Seoul from the eastward, following its crossing of the Han, while other 7 th Div elements were to patrol southward from Suwon, captured on the 21 st.

The 7 th Marines had the new mission of advancing across the northern edge of the city, cutting the Pyongyang-Seoul highway, and taking up a series of blocking positions to prevent the escape of the enemy from Seoul. Meanwhile the 1 st and 5 th Marines were to deliver their all-out attack on the city. The 5 th Marines jumped off on the 25 th with the 2d and 3d Bns in assault from right to left.

Both were held up for hours by a heavy concentration of enemy mortar and automatic fire from Hill B. On the extreme left flank the 1 st Bn was drawn into the fight along with the Recon Co and Korean Bn in an attempt to outflank the enemy.

Not until was the hill finally taken after a costly frontal advance by the 2d Bn, supported by the flank attacks of the other units. The extent of enemy resistance is best described by the fact that some 1, enemy dead were counted on and about Hill B. Meanwhile the assault by the 1 st Marines began with the 3d Bn passing through the 2d to tie in with the 1 st on the right. This shifted the direction of attack 90 degrees to the left, so that the course of the regiment led directly through the heart of Seoul while RCT-5 drove through the northwest quarter.

Stubborn resistance at a rail embankment held up the 1 st Marines until noon, after mines prevented the tanks from coming to their support. Air and artillery finally dislodged the enemy, who continued the struggle by pouring in mortar and automatic fire from rooftops and road blocks. By evening the regiment had advanced 1, to 2, yards into the city, while the 7 th Marines on the northern flank had occupied all their objectives without meeting resistance. If the weary Leathernecks had counted on any rest that night they were soon disillusioned.

At an X Corps flash teletyped message reported the enemy to be fleeing Seoul and ordered an immediate pursuit by the 1 st Mar Div. Division G-3 questioned the accuracy of intelligence based on night air identification and concluded that the fugitives were civilian refugees. Upon contacting G-3 of Corps, however, Division G-3 was informed that the Marine advance was to begin without delay. At General Smith gave the attack order to the commanding officers of the 1 st and 5 th Marines, directing them to concentrate along streets which could be identified at night.

An hour later G-3 passed on the order to the commanding officers of the 7 th and 11 th Marines. By that time the 3d Bn of the 5 th Marines had already received a counterattack which lasted all night. Further testimony that reports of an enemy flight were premature might have been given by Cpl Charles E. Collins of B Co, 1 st Marines. Leading a patrol shortly after midnight to make contact with the 3 d Bn, 5 th Marines, he spaced his eight men about feet apart in a little column fumbling its way up one side of the street.

Suddenly the Leathernecks stumbled into enemy preparations for a large tank and infantry counterattack. All hell broke loose when the uninvited guests were identified. North Korean automatic weapons and tank guns blazed away indiscriminately, hitting nobody but making an infernal racket in the empty streets. Cpl Collins yelled for his men to get back to the CP as best they could and give warning. Meanwhile, he stuck it out under friendly as well as enemy fire until avenues of escape were closed.

At , with all other members of the patrol safe, Collins had been given up for dead when he returned to the CP, wearing white Korean civilian garments he had found in a house which hid him from the enemy. This exploit was worth a Bronze Star and an extra stripe when reported to division headquarters.

By that time the 3d Bn had received his warning and repulsed the counterattack. The enemy was estimated at battalion strength with 12 tanks, five of which were knocked out by mines and 3. Intensive artillery fires aided the Marines, and about of the enemy were believed to have been killed. Altogether, it was a night of confused alarms and excursions for both regiments in the dark city of seemingly empty streets. No contact could be made between regiments, so that a coordinated advance was out of the question when the Marines attacked at in accordance with X Corps orders.

Little progress was made before dawn, and two more days of savage street fighting awaited the Leathernecks as they cut a wide swath straight through the city. It would have encouraged them to know that at on 26 September elements of the 7 th Div made contact with the 1 st Cav Div of the U. Eighth Army about five miles south of Suwon.

This meant that the Eighth Army had the enemy on the run after launching a coordinated offensive the day after the Inchon landing. With the main NK supply line cut at Seoul, enemy forces in the southern part of the peninsula were rapidly falling apart at the seams. In some sectors all organized resistance had ceased, and whole NK units were melting away as the troops buried their weapons and changed to civilian clothing.

Mount's battalion in a predawn attack caught North Koreans asleep in their positions and overran them. In this surprise action the battalion captured a regimental headquarters and much equipment, and broke the remaining enemy strength close to the south bank of the river opposite Seoul. During the day the battalion cleared the south bank of the Han in the fold of the river southeast of the city.

This made possible an important action the next morning. While the 7th Division was securing X Corps' southern flank, the heaviest fighting in the battle for Seoul began at the city's western edge on 22 September and lasted four days. The North Korean defense line at the western edge of Seoul was anchored at the north on Hill just south of the Kaesong highway and west of Seoul's Sodaemun Prison.

From the crest of Hill the North Korean line curved in a gentle half-moon eastward and southward down spur ridges two and a half miles to the Han River, the concave side facing west toward the United Nations troops. The greater part of this uneven ridge line was dominated by three hills, each meters high, and accordingly known as Hills Hills North and Center lay north of the rail and highway lines running into Seoul along the northern bank of the Han River; Hill South lay between the rail and road lines and the river.

Hills Center and South completely dominated the Pusan-to-Manchuria Kyonggi main rail line and the road that passed through the saddle between them to enter the city. These hills had been a training area for Japanese troops during the period of Japanese domination and since then of both South and North Korean soldiers.

The area was well covered with various types of field fortifications and susceptible to quick organization for defense. The main railroad station and Government House lay in the center of Seoul two miles east of these positions.

The principal enemy unit manning this line was the N. Newly formed a month earlier at Ch'orwon, it had started moving by train from that place to Seoul on the day of the Inch'on landing, most of it arriving there four days later on 19 September. Wol Ki Chan, forty-five years of age and formerly a student in Russia, commanded the brigade.

Most of the brigade's officers and noncommissioned officers had had previous combat experience with the Chinese Communist Forces. The brigade numbered about 2, men, and apparently was composed of two infantry battalions, four heavy machine gun battalions, an engineer battalion, a mm. It and the 78th Independent Regiment defended both the military and topographic crests. Foxholes, undercut into the slopes, gave protection from overhead shell air bursts. Concrete caves held supplies. More than fifty heavy machine guns with interlocking fields of fire dotted this defensive position.

On the morning of 22 September the 5th Marines set out to capture these last hills in front of Seoul. On the north flank the 3d Battalion's objective was Hill In the center, the objective of the 2d Battalion, ROK Marines, was Hill Center, but the battalion had to take two knobs called Hills 66 and 88 before reaching the main hill behind them.

On the south flank across the railroad track the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, objective was Hill South. The attack began at Two hours later the 3d Battalion on the north reported it had captured its objective against only moderate resistance, but this report was misleading because the battalion did not have control of the southern slopes and ridges of Hill where the North Korean strength was concentrated.

On the southern flank heavy enemy fire stopped the 1st Battalion for a while, but late in the day it took Hill South after a smashing artillery and mortar preparation.

But enemy artillery scored too, some of its fire landing in the 1st Battalion rear areas and inflicting thirty-nine casualties there during the day, including six killed. The fighting was heavy there all day long. Marine air strikes tried in vain to destroy the enemy positions. Later, North Korean prisoners said that the 25th Brigade had 40 percent casualties that day. The next morning, 23 September, the Korean marines resumed the battle in the center and suffered continuing heavy casualties, while accomplishing little.

At midafternoon the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, on orders from Colonel Murray, took over the attack in the center. After sustaining many casualties with little gain, the lead company D dug in for the night, short of the enemy-held ridge.

In another furious fight, one platoon of F Company suffered so many casualties it had only seven men left for duty at nightfall. Meanwhile, the rest of the regiment had held in place on the flanks and repelled counterattacks during the day. At noon on 23 September General Smith had ordered the 7th Marines, which had begun unloading at Inch'on on the 21st, to cross the Han and come up behind the 5th Marines. After daylight on the 24th, elements of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, started down the finger ridge from Hill , hoping to outflank the enemy in front of the 2d Battalion in the center.

Simultaneously, D Company moved out in assault against the ridge line. A heavy morning mist shrouded the company as it crossed the low ground and reached the base of Hill Unexpectedly, the lead elements came upon enemy troops in their trenches. Neither side saw the other because of the fog and smoke until they were at close quarters.

A grenade battle started immediately. In an effort to break the deadlock, Marine air strikes came in repeatedly. In the course of two such attacks, North Korean antiaircraft fire damaged five of ten planes. Enemy automatic and mortar fire became intense after the fog lifted. In the early afternoon the 30 remaining effectives in D Company's rifle platoons and 14 other men assembled from the Weapons Platoon; ammunition carriers, and company headquarters prepared for a desperate assault against the ridge line of Hill Thirty-three men were to make the assault up the last yards of the slope others were to follow with machine guns and ammunition.

Corsairs came over for final strafing runs, bombing, and napalming of the enemy position. This done, the 33 men, at a prearranged signal of a Corsair's second dry run over the enemy, jumped from their holes and charged forward in a yard-long line.

The D Company commander, 1st Lt. Smith, was killed in front of his men. The others kept going and 26 of them reached the top.

The headlong charge surprised the North Koreans; in a sudden panic many ran down the back slope, others feigned death, and some fought back. Enemy dead were stacked up everywhere-in foxholes, in bunkers-and many were strewn about over the ground. When all of D Company's men reached the top there were 56 men to defend it, 26 of them wounded but refusing evacuation. They held the hill against a counterattack. During this day, D Company suffered casualties among its men killed, wounded and evacuated, and 26 more wounded but present for duty.

Events were to prove that D Company's capture of Hill 66 on the afternoon of the 24th was the decisive action in the battle at the western gate to Seoul. The 2d Battalion on the morning of the 25th resumed the attack toward Hill Center.

Artillery and fighter bombers pounded the enemy-held hill line all morning. From recently captured Hill 66, D Company advanced northward slowly during the morning up the shank of the fishhook ridge line that slanted southwest from Hill , and then turned southeast to capture Hill 88 at the point of the hook just after noon.

By midafternoon other elements of the 2d Battalion had captured Hill Center, and the 3d Battalion had gained control of Hill North after very heavy fighting. According to prisoners, three enemy battalions lost men during the day trying to hold the northern hill. The western defenses of Seoul had fallen. More than 1, dead enemy soldiers lay on their stubbornly defended positions. Marine estimates placed the total number of enemy killed there by all arms at 1, When the enemy defenses at the western edge of Seoul fell on 25 September, the 1st Marine Division had all its regi-.

At on the night of 23 September, the division had issued an operations order, confirming earlier verbal orders, directing the 1st Marines to cross the Han River early the next. During the morning of 24 September the 1st Marines began crossing the Han from Yongdungp'o in the shadow of Hill South, where the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, protected the crossing site. Before dark the regiment had crossed to the north side and the 1st and 2d Battalions had taken over from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, the southern flank of the Marine line at the western edge of Seoul.

By now the 7th Marines had moved up on the left flank of the 5th Marines, with the mission of cutting across the northern edge of Seoul and blocking escape routes there. The 3d Battalion of the th Airborne Regiment airlifted from Ashiya, Japan, to Kimpo Airfield on the 24th and upon arrival there assumed responsibility for the airfield.

On the morning of 25 September, two platoons of tanks from B Company, 1st Tank Battalion, including two dozer tanks and a section of flame-throwing tanks, accompanied by a platoon of engineers and another of infantry set out to join the 1st Marines in Seoul. Near the base of Hill South, an enemy force with several antitank guns ambushed the column. The fighting was heavy and the outcome in doubt for several minutes until a flame-thrower tank reached a point from which it.

Many North Korean soldiers broke from cover. Machine gun fire from other tanks cut them down as they ran. Several North Koreans came out of a previously undiscovered cave and surrendered. When a large group inside the cave saw these men unhurt they too surrendered.

Of the nearly North Koreans that attacked this armored column, approximately were killed, captured. The tank column joined Colonel Puller's 1st Marines in Seoul at noon. While it was doing this, the 1st Battalion on its right held a blocking position at the southern edge of Seoul.

Once the 3d Battalion had turned northward, the 1st Battalion pivoted to orient its attack northward abreast of and on the right of it. Street fighting now began in Seoul, 25 September, in the zone of the 1st Marines just as the 5th Marines completed its capture of the North Korean defensive hill line at the western edge of the city.

By this time an important change had taken place in the plan to capture Seoul. The original operations plan required the 1st Marine Division to clear the city. But the expected capture of Seoul by the marines was moving behind schedule. The stubborn enemy defense had denied the Marine division any important advance for three days.

General Almond, the corps commander, had been growing increasingly impatient. It was a political and psychological as well as a military target. General MacArthur desired to capture the city as soon as possible and restore the Korean capital to its people.

Dissatisfied with the marines' progress, General Almond on 23 September told General Smith that he could continue his frontal assaults but that he strongly urged him to use the space south of the Han River for an envelopment maneuver by the 1st Marines. Smith was unwilling to act on Almond's suggestion because he wanted to unite the 1st and 5th Marines on the north side of the Han instead of having them on opposite sides of the river. Almond told Smith that he would give him twenty-four hours longer to make headway.

If Smith could not, Almond said, he would change division boundaries and bring the 7th Infantry Division and its 32d Regiment into the battle for the envelopment of the enemy defenses in Seoul.

Henry I. Hodes, assistant 7th Division commander, and Col. Louis T. Heath, the division chief of staff. Almond told Barr he had tentatively decided that the 7th Division would attack across the Han River into Seoul the next morning. Almond then returned to his command post and there told Colonel Paik, commander of the ROK 17th Regiment, that he expected to attach his regiment to the 32d Infantry for the attack on Seoul.

His mind now made up, Almond called a commanders' conference to meet with him at at Yongdungp'o Circle. John H. In this open-air meeting, Almond quickly told the assembled commanders that he was changing the boundary between the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division, and that the 32d Regiment, with the ROK 17th Regiment attached, would attack across the Han River into Seoul at the next morning.

The meeting was brief. At its conclusion the officers dispersed at once to make their respective plans. The crossing was to be at the Sinsa-ri ferry, three miles east of the main rail and highway bridges over the Han River. On the opposite north bank, South Mountain Nam-san extended from the river northwest two miles into the heart of Seoul, culminating in a peak feet high, the highest point in the city, about one mile east of the main Seoul rail station.

A long, ridgelike, shallow saddle connected this peak with a slightly lower one. On a western finger ridge of the main peak, near the foot elevation and only half a mile from the rail station, was a large shrine and a formally landscaped park. From the western base of South Mountain a long series of steps led up to this shrine and park. Viewing Seoul on a north-south axis, the peak of South Mountain was halfway into the city. Government House, at the northern edge of the city, lay two miles away.

The main highway and rail line running east out of the city passed about a mile beyond the northern base of South Mountain. On this mountain nearly three months before, a company of ROK soldiers had conducted the last action in the defense of Seoul, dying, it has been said, to the last man.

The 32d Infantry's mission was first to seize and secure South Mountain, then to secure Hill situated two miles eastward at the southeast edge of Seoul, and finally to seize and secure. Government House is in the center. Hill , a large, high hill mass five miles east of Seoul and dominating the highway and rail line entering the city from that side. The regiment had a strength of 4, men as it prepared for the crossing-3, Americans and 1, ROK's.

Before daybreak of the 25th, General Hodes established an advanced division command post near the river from which he was to direct the crossing operation.

General Barr went forward at to the 32d Infantry's command post and an hour later he and Colonel Beauchamp left for an observation post near the river. At , the 48th Field Artillery Battalion began firing a minute artillery preparation, and the heavy mortars joined in to. Colonel Mount's 2d Battalion, selected to make the assault crossing, loaded into amphibious tractors in its assembly area and at F Company started across the Han.

A ground fog obscured the river area. The entire 2d Battalion reached the north bank without loss of personnel or equipment. The 2d Battalion hurried across the narrow river beach, scaled the to foot cliffs, and moved rapidly to the slopes of South Mountain. An hour after the first troops had crossed the river the bright morning sun dispersed the ground fog.

Air strikes then came in on South Mountain and Hill Apparently this crossing surprised the North Koreans. Their works on South Mountain were only lightly manned.

The 1st Battalion, commanded by Colonel Faith, followed the 2d across the Han and at started to move east along the river bank toward Hill Just after noon the 3d Battalion crossed the river, followed the 1st Battalion eastward, and passed through it to occupy Hill The 1st Battalion then took a position between the 3d and 2d Battalions. The ROK 17th Regiment crossed the Han immediately behind the 3d Battalion and moved to the extreme right flank of the 32d Infantry line where, at , it began an all-night attack toward Hill While the rest of the regiment crossed the Han behind it and moved eastward, the 2d Battalion climbed the slopes of South Mountain, reaching and clearing the summit against moderate resistance by Once there, it immediately began digging in on a tight perimeter.

The North Koreans did not counterattack South Mountain as quickly as expected. The night passed tensely but quietly for the waiting 2d Battalion. Finally, at on the morning of the 26th, the soldiers heard tanks moving about and the sound of automatic weapons fire to their front. In semi-darkness half an hour later a large enemy force, estimated to number approximately 1, men, violently counterattacked the 2d Battalion perimeter on top of South Mountain.

On the higher western knob of the mountain, G Company held its position against this attack, but on the lower eastern knob North Koreans overran F Company.

Using all its reserves, Colonel Mount's battalion finally restored its positions at after two hours of battle and drove the surviving enemy down the slopes. Mount's men counted enemy dead within its perimeter and more outside for a total of enemy killed. They took prisoners. E Company mopped up enemy troops on the rear slopes of the mountain and in the area at its base near the river. Later in the morning, elements of the 1st Battalion had a sharp engagement in the streets immediately north of South Mountain, capturing there some eighty enemy soldiers, apparently a remnant.

To the east, the 1st Battalion on the morning of the 26th engaged in a heavy fire fight while the 3d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Heinrich G. Schumann, advanced from Hill toward Hill , four miles farther east. In this advance, L Company saw a large column of enemy troops on the highway leaving Seoul. The company commander; 1st Lt. Harry J. McCaffrey, Jr. His initiative paid off. In the ensuing action, L Company killed about North Korean soldiers, destroyed 5 tanks, destroyed or captured more than 40 vehicles, 3 artillery pieces, 7 machine guns, 2 ammunition dumps, much clothing and POL products, and overran and captured a large headquarters of corps size, which may have been the principal enemy headquarters in the defense of Seoul.

That evening the 32d Infantry and the ROK 17th Regiment cleared their zone of the enemy, and E Company established contact with the marines on the regimental left at the western base of South Mountain.

When the 1st Marine Regiment turned north that day, ahead of it lay the main Seoul railroad station. The 5th Marines, on the other hand, was just entering the city in the northwest quarter, pointed generally eastward toward Government House two miles away. Its course would take it past big Sodaemun Prison.

That evening the 1st and 5th Marines made plans for a co-ordinated attack the next morning. Just before dusk an air report claimed that enemy columns were streaming north out of the city. General Almond at X Corps headquarters immediately sent a message to the Far East Air Forces requesting a flare mission to illuminate the roads so that Marine night fighters could attack the enemy troops.

A B dropped flares for several hours and two long columns of enemy soldiers came under air attack. Corps artillery placed interdiction fire on the closer portions of the escape route. He is conducting heavy air attack and will con-. You will push attack now to the limit of your objective in order to insure maximum destruction of enemy forces.

Alpha L. Bowser, 1st Marine Division operations officer, doubted that the enemy was fleeing the city.